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Crowding Out of Monetary Policy as a Limitation of Fiscal Policy 
 
 
 
If expansionary fiscal policy is inflationary, expansionary fiscal policy forces an inflation-
targeting central bank to be somewhat more restrictive in its monetary policy. This altered 
central bank policy comes at a cost in terms of output which has to be calculated against the 
output gain achieved by the expansionary fiscal policy.  
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
According to Alston et al. (1992), most economists agree that fiscal policy has a significant 
stimulative impact on a less than fully employed economy. The consensus seems to be that 
while some offsetting factors exist (such as higher interest rates or Ricardian-type inter-
temporal adjustments), those offsets are only partial.  
 
This paper adds another effect to the list of potentially offsetting factors: If expansionary 
fiscal policy is inflationary, expansionary fiscal policy forces an inflation-targeting central 
bank to be somewhat more restrictive in its monetary policy. This, however, comes at a cost 
in terms of output which has to be taken into account when calculating the output gain 
achieved by expansionary fiscal policy.  
 
The paper develops a simple model to show this effect. The model uses comparative statics 
and fairly weak assumptions. The model is not microfounded as the basic mechanism can 
most easily be shown by using aggregate macroeconomic relationships. 
 
 
 
Model 
 
To see the argument, Table 1 is a good starting point. The table shows how expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policy measures affect real GDP and inflation. 
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Table 1: Fiscal and Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanisms 
 
 
Expansionary fiscal policy 
 
 
Expansionary monetary policy 
 
 
Government spends additional money (∆𝐺) 
 
Central bank creates additional money (∆𝑀) 
 
Government acquired the 
money it additionally spends 
through higher taxes or 
through increased borrowing 
 
Government 
had hoarded 
the money it 
additionally 
spends  
(unlikely) 
Commercial 
banks hoard 
the addition-
al money in 
their excess 
reserves 
Commercial banks pass the 
additional money through to 
their customers (borrowers) 
 
Money so 
received 
would have 
been spent 
otherwise 
 
 
Money so 
received 
would have 
been hoarded 
otherwise 
 
Borrowers 
hoard the 
money  
(unlikely) 
Borrowers 
spend the 
money 
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
 
↓ 
 
↓ 
 
No effect on 
aggregate 
demand 
 
Effect on  
aggregate  
demand 
No effect on  
aggregate  
demand 
Effect on 
aggregate 
demand 
 
Possible additional effect on  
aggregate demand* 
 
 
Possible additional effect on  
aggregate demand* 
 
 
Supply is  
perfectly elastic 
 
 
Supply is  
perfectly inelastic 
 
  
Supply is  
perfectly elastic 
 
 
Supply is  
perfectly inelastic 
 
 
Real GDP  
increases by 
𝑦𝐺∆𝐺 
 
Inflation  
increases by 
𝜋G∆G 
  
Real GDP  
increases by 
𝑦𝑀∆𝑀 
 
 
Inflation  
increases by 
𝜋𝑀∆𝑀 
 
 
 
* There may be an additional effect on aggregate demand if other actors (households for example) hoard less 
and spend more money in response to the policy action. For example, if the additional government spending is 
financed through higher borrowing, this may drive up interest rates. This may induce households to hoard less 
money, either by spending it or by bringing it to their bank. The bank may then lend this money to borrowers 
who likely spend it. Next to higher interest rates, changed asset prices, changed exchange rates, and changed 
expectations may induce similar effects.  
 
 
Table 1 starts with the fact that the government cannot create money. Therefore, if the gov-
ernment wants to spend additional money, it either has to use money it hoards or has to take 
away the additional money from someone else (taxpayer, lenders, etc.). If this someone else 
would have spent the money as well, aggregate demand does not increase. An effect on ag-
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gregate demand only materializes if the money would have been hoarded otherwise. It should 
be noted that hoarding money is different from bringing money to the bank. This is because 
if money is brought to the bank, the bank will likely lend it out again. Thus, this money does 
not lay idle. Hoarded money, on the other hand, lays idle.  
 
Major “hoarders” in an economy are households that hold cash. Firms, on the other hand, are 
usually too cost-conscious to hoard much cash. Commercial banks may hoard money by 
holding excess reserves at the central bank. This may even earn them interest. For this and 
other reasons, commercial banks have recently become major hoarders in some economies. 
In the US, for example, excess reserves have increased from less than $2 billion in 2007 to 
about $2,700 billion by 2014. Like the central bank, but unlike households and firms, the 
government can also hoard money at the central bank by depositing money in its account 
there. However, given their high debt levels, most governments do not systematically hoard 
money there nowadays. 
 
Unlike the government, the central bank can create money. Thus, it does not have to worry 
where its money comes from and whether this money would have been spent otherwise. In 
that regard, creating additional aggregate demand is easier for the central bank than for the 
government. However, in another regard, it is also harder for the central bank as it generally 
does not purchase final goods and services directly. Rather, it works through commercial 
banks which may then pass the money through to borrowers. The borrowers will then usually 
spend the money as there is little point in borrowing money otherwise. 
 
Thus, as Table 1 shows, fiscal and monetary policy measures can have a positive effect on 
aggregate demand. On top of this, an additional effect on aggregate demand may materialize 
if, in response to the policy action, other actors, such as households, hoard less and spend 
more. Such altered behavior may be induced by changed interest rates, changed asset prices, 
changed exchange rates, or changed expectations. 
 
Once aggregate demand increases, the question becomes how elastically the additionally de-
manded goods and services are supplied. If supply is perfectly elastic, real GDP will increase 
(by 𝑦𝐺∆𝐺 and 𝑦𝑀∆𝑀 respectively). If supply is perfectly inelastic, inflation will increase (by 
𝜋𝐺∆𝐺 and 𝜋𝑀∆𝑀 respectively). If supply is somewhat elastic, both real GDP and inflation 
will increase somewhat. 
 
Based on that, let's assume firstly that 
 
𝑌 = 𝑦𝐺𝐺 +  𝑦𝑀𝑀 +  𝑦𝑅𝑅,      (1) 
 
where Y is real GDP, G is government spending, M is central bank money creation (that is 
the money stock) and R is a residual term that captures all other factors that influence real 
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GDP, such as technology, the capital stock and labor supply. As in Table 1, the parameters yG 
and yM capture how fiscal and monetary policy measures affect real GDP.  
 
The money stock, as understood here, includes central bank money as well as that part of 
commercial bank money that is used for transactional purposes (e.g. demand deposits but not 
savings deposits etc.). In the fractional-reserve banking system common today, the central 
bank has some but not complete control over the so defined money stock. The situation mir-
rors the situation of the government which has complete control over its discretionary spend-
ing, but incomplete control over its non-discretionary spending (that is spending mandated on 
a multi-year basis by existing legislation). Both the central bank and the government have, 
however, sufficient control over their respective tools to meaningfully execute their policy. 
 
Let’s assume secondly that 
 
𝜋 = 𝜋𝐺𝐺 +  𝜋𝑀𝑀 +  𝜋𝑆𝑆,      (2) 
 
where π is inflation, G is government spending, M is the money stock and S is a residual term 
that captures all other factors that influence inflation, such as oil price and wage shocks. As 
in Table 1, the parameters 𝜋G and 𝜋M capture how fiscal and monetary policy measures affect 
inflation.  
 
Note that both assumptions are very weak, and nearly tautological, as 𝑦𝐺 , 𝑦𝑀 , 𝜋𝐺  and 𝜋𝑀 can 
in principle take any value (including zero), and as R and S act as residuals. 
 
Let’s assume thirdly that the central bank follows an inflation target and is successful in 
achieving it, so that inflation is constant: 
 
𝜋 = 𝜋𝐺𝐺 +  𝜋𝑀𝑀 +  𝜋𝑆𝑆 = const.     (3) 
 
This assumption is a bit of a stretch as central banks cannot completely control inflation. We 
will relax this assumption therefore later. 
 
Solving equation (3) for the money stock and plugging the result into equation (1) yields: 
 
𝑌 = 𝑦𝐺𝐺 +  𝑦𝑀
(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 −𝜋𝐺𝐺−𝜋𝑆𝑆)
𝜋𝑀
+  𝑦𝑅𝑅.    (4) 
 
Taking the partial derivative with respect to government spending yields: 
 
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝐺
= 𝑦𝐺 − 𝑦𝑀
𝜋𝐺
𝜋𝑀
     for    𝜋M ≠ 0.     (5) 
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Results and Discussion 
 
The results of the model are:  
 
1. If 𝑦𝑀, 𝜋G  and 𝜋M  are positive, the impact of expansionary fiscal policy on growth is 
less than the “pure” fiscal coefficient 𝑦𝐺 . An offsetting effect exists. Fiscal policy is 
somewhat less efficient than frequently perceived. 
 
2. If 𝑦𝑀 is equal to zero or negative (that is if expansionary monetary policy does not af-
fect growth or even reduces growth), no offsetting effect exists as the less expansion-
ary monetary policy is then irrelevant or even good for growth. 
 
Discussion: It seems unlikely that expansionary monetary policy does not affect 
growth or even reduces growth. After all, the basic assumption of the paper is that 
fiscal policy can have a significant stimulative impact on an economy – a point shared 
by most economists, as quoted at the beginning of the paper. If this is the case, how-
ever, there is no reason why only government-induced additional aggregate demand 
should have an impact on growth and central-bank-induced additional aggregate de-
mand should have not (see also Table 1). 
 
3. If 𝜋G is equal to zero or negative (that is if expansionary fiscal policy is inflation-
neutral or even deflationary), no offsetting effect exists. After all, if expansionary fis-
cal policy is not inflationary, there is no reason for a central bank to cut back on mon-
etary policy in response to expansionary fiscal policy.  
 
Discussion: It seems unlikely that expansionary fiscal policy is inflation-neutral or 
even deflationary. If we assume, as above, that fiscal policy can have a significant 
stimulative impact on an economy, then it is highly likely that part of the impact hits 
inflation rather than real GDP. After all, otherwise we would have to assume that 
each and every good and service that is additionally demanded is permanently sup-
plied perfectly elastic. 
Also not a counter-argument is the idea that inflation is always and everywhere a 
monetary, rather than a fiscal, phenomenon (Friedman 1970). This is because the left-
hand side of the quantity equation includes, next to money, the velocity of money. 
The velocity of money, however, reflects hoarding of money which, as Table 1 
shows, can be affected by fiscal policy. 
 
4. If 𝜋M is equal to zero (that is if expansionary monetary policy does not affect infla-
tion), equation (5) is undefined.  
 
Discussion: Expansionary monetary policy not affecting inflation does not seem to be 
much of a concern. Central banks have repeatedly shown capable of generating mas-
sive inflations, even hyperinflations.  
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Currently, some central banks can be seen struggling with increasing inflation. How-
ever, this should not be interpreted as a general inability of central banks to affect in-
flation. Rather, it reflects an understandable reluctance by central banks to make early 
full use of the entire potential arsenal of monetary policy. What it highlights, though, 
is that central banks cannot control inflation completely at will (see next point). 
 
5. Equation (3) implicitly assumes that the central bank can return inflation to the de-
sired level immediately. This assumption is a bit of a stretch as central banks cannot 
completely control inflation. However, the result in equation (5) holds as long as the 
central bank somewhat responds to inflation deviating from target. The offsetting ef-
fect is smaller then, though.  
 
Discussion: Relaxing equation (3) seems appropriate as central banks do not com-
pletely control inflation. However, as discussed, it is sufficient to assume that the cen-
tral bank somewhat cuts back on monetary policy in response to a more expansionary 
fiscal policy. And this is realistic.  
This point is most obvious for central banks that explicitly target the inflation rate. 
After all, they derive their policy actions from a model which forecasts the future path 
of inflation. As this forecast usually includes the government’s fiscal stance as a vari-
able that drives up inflation, a near-mechanistic feedback loop exists. 
And even central banks that target inflation less explicitly seem to react to fiscal poli-
cy. For example, when the ECB reverted to quantitative easing in 2015, it stated that 
it did so because most indicators of actual and expected inflation had drifted towards 
their historical lows (ECB 2015). It can be assumed that with less fiscal support (Eu-
rozone fiscal policy became gradually more expansionary in 2014, see e.g. IMF 
2015), this situation would have arisen sooner and the ECB would have started quan-
titative easing earlier. 
That central banks take an interest in fiscal policy can also be seen from their organi-
zation charts as most of them run fiscal policy units (e.g. ECB Fiscal Policy Division, 
Fed Fiscal Analysis Section, etc.). 
 
6. Equation (5) shows that fiscal policy will be the more effective the larger the inherent 
growth effect of fiscal policy (the higher yG), the less the inherent growth effect of 
monetary policy (the lower yM ), the lower the “inflation cost” of fiscal policy (the 
lower 𝜋G) and the higher the “inflation cost” of monetary policy (the higher 𝜋M).  
 
7. If the second term of equation (5) is equal to or larger than yG, expansionary fiscal 
policy is ineffective or even contractionary. This is the case if monetary policy is 
equally good or better than fiscal policy in boosting growth, and less or equally bad in 
causing inflation by doing so.  
 
Discussion: Parameter sizes can only be determined empirically. This paper is largely 
agnostic about their size. As argued above, there is, however, some theoretical reason 
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to believe that 𝑦M , 𝜋G  and 𝜋M  are positive. In this case, some offsetting effect in the 
sense of this paper exists. The exact size of this offsetting effect is open. The fact that 
central banks do not completely control inflation and may accommodate expansion-
ary fiscal policy somewhat may reduce the size of the offsetting effect somewhat (see 
above). 
 
8. It is not possible to turn the result around and show by the same token that expansion-
ary monetary policy crowds out expansionary fiscal policy. This is because equation 
(3) binds only the central bank. After all, it is the central bank, and not the govern-
ment, which is tasked with achieving a certain inflation rate. 
 
9. The recent increase in excess reserves reduced the size of 𝑦𝑀 and 𝜋M for a given poli-
cy action ∆𝑀 (see Table 1). From equation (5), we can see, however, that the absolute 
size of 𝑦𝑀 and 𝜋M does not affect the size of the offsetting effect. The size is the same 
size whether 𝑦𝑀 and 𝜋M are 0.4 and 0.6, or 0.04 and 0.06.  
 
 
 
Policy Implications 
 
The main policy implications of the paper are:  
 
1. Given the offsetting effect described in this paper, fiscal policy may be less efficient 
than frequently perceived. This should make governments somewhat more reluctant 
with respect to active aggregate demand management.  
One might claim that at least in a situation where a central bank undershoots its infla-
tion target, some fiscal support is welcome. However, as argued above, central banks 
generally do not lack the means to achieve a given inflation rate but are usually just 
reluctant to make full early use of their entire arsenal. All too active, or even erratic, 
fiscal policy may then mostly work to complicate the picture for the central bank. 
And it may delay the central bank’s response, as argued for the ECB above. 
 
2. The offsetting effect described in this paper has special implications for currency un-
ions, such as the euro area. This is because if monetary policy becomes less expan-
sionary when fiscal policy becomes more expansionary, then also monetary policy 
becomes more expansionary when fiscal policy becomes less expansionary. In that 
sense, and in contrast to conventional wisdom, it might actually be good for aggregate 
demand in, say, crisis-stricken Greece if the fiscal stance in the other euro area coun-
tries is not too expansionary. After all, the less expansionary fiscal policy in these 
countries, the more expansionary ECB monetary policy can be. The latter may actual-
ly be more helpful for aggregate demand in Greece than higher government spending 
in countries as distant as, say, Germany.
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